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Important changes relating to surveillance powers are afoot on both sides of 
the Atlantic. A new Investigatory Powers Bill (IPB) was introduced to the UK 
Parliament by the Home Secretary, Theresa May, on 4 November 2015, whilst the US 
Senate Intelligence Committee has already voted in favour of Cybesecurity 
Information Sharing Act (CISA). Both of these new pieces of legislation follow in the 
footsteps of Edward Snowden 2013 revelations relating to the National Security 
Agency (NSA) and Government Telecommunications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
interception and collection of telephone and digital communications en mass and, we 
are told, are an attempt to address the significant privacy and security concerns. The 
US and the UK governments advocate that these new measures represent much 
needed surveillance powers reform. But what do they really allow for? What 
safeguards do they create and most importantly, how do they relate to the obligations 
of privacy protection under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Article 17 the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of the 
countries concerned? 
 
 CISA’s aim is to enable companies and federal agencies to coordinate 
responses to cyber attacks. To that end, the Act grants new, sweeping powers to 
private enterprises. First, it allows them to voluntarily share ‘cybersecurity threat 
data’, including personal information about individuals, with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), who could then pass it on in real time to other agencies, 
such as the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Secondly, it 
authorises companies to deploy ‘defensive measures’ for ‘cybersecurity purposes’ and 
allows them to monitor information systems to protect their hardware and software. 
Critics agree that the CISA dresses new government surveillance mechanisms in a 
cloak of security protection. Their unease and concern centres around both what the 
Act allows for and what it does not address. As far as sharing cybersecurity data is 
concerned, the CISA authorises passing on information that falls within the rubric of 
‘cyber threat indicators’ ‘notwithstanding any other provision of the law’, whilst also 
obliging companies to remove some personal information before sharing it with the 
government. ‘Threat indicators’ are broadly defined and therefore allow any 
information to be construed as such. Consequently, not only does CISA authorise vast 
amounts of personal data to be shared without adequate privacy protections, but also 
permits the federal, state and local governments to use the ‘indicators’ for criminal 
investigations that may be completely unrelated to cybersecurity and since all other 
laws are subordinated to CISA, avoid due process protection. The defenders of CISA, 
such as Richard Burr, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, dismisses these 
worries pointing to the voluntary nature of the information sharing, but disregarding 
the fact that companies will receive incentives in a form of protection from any 
liability that may arise as a result of sharing private information directly with the 
DHS. Then, there is the problem of vetting data in order to remove personal 
information before it is shared, which is hard to reconcile with the government’s duty 
under Article 17 ICCPR to ensure in law confidentiality of correspondence. In 
addition, companies may leave personal and identifying information in the indictors 
they share, unless they know that the information is not directly related to a threat. 
According to the letter from 55 civil society organizations of 20 April 2015 to the 
Senate, ‘this allows companies to share virtually all personal and identifying 
information in indicators by default’. Yet, the Act does not address what it was set out 
to do, namely it does nothing to prevent intrusion into networks and leaks out of them, 
therefore does not deliver on the promise that it will help protect personal information 
from being hacked and stolen. The net result of the CISA is the carte blanche given to 
the private sector to collect, vet and pass on private data disregarding other laws, 
including human rights protection and cast a wide surveillance net for the intelligence 
community and domestic law enforcement, without setting out any remedies, 
transparency, or independent oversights. 
 The UK Investigatory Powers Bill, does not seem to be faring any better. 
Ostensibly, it aims to give the police and security agencies tools to keep us safe. In 
reality, it requires web and phone companies to store records of the websites visited 
by every individual for 12 months to allow access and for the first time confirms in 
writing the continued bulk collection and interception of vast volumes of personal 
communications, both content and metadata. According to the IPB, interception of the 
content of communications, such as a telephone call, email or social media messages 
will be allowed, provided a warrant is obtained from the Secretary of State and signed 
off by a panel of independent judges with a power of a veto. The judges will review 
warrants issued by ministers taking into account the criteria of necessity and 
proportionality. Theresa May referred to these new powers of oversight as a ‘double 
lock’ system. However, in circumstances of exceptional urgency the judges will not 
need to be involved. Metadata, including website browsing history, will be made 
available without a warrant, which arguably reinforces indiscriminate mass 
surveillance, as this type of data is in many cases more telling and valuable than 
content of communications. This provision seems at odds with the Court of Justice of 
the European Union 2015 decision in Digital Rights Ireland where it was 
unequivocally stated that the requirement placed on internet and telecommunication 
service providers mandating bulk retention of metadata of all individuals, even those 
not suspected of having a remote connection to any crime, interfered in particularly 
serious manner with the right to privacy.  In addition, the Investigatory Powers Bill 
gives explicit powers to both the security agencies and the police to hack into and bug 
computers and phones. It also obliges companies to assist them to bypass encryption. 
Mrs May, introducing the new draft Act, stated that it will provide a modern legal 
framework, having openness, transparency and oversight, whilst giving the 
intelligence services their licence to operate. Human rights organizations, such as 
Liberty disagree, calling this new legislative effort ‘an astonishing assault on all of 
our Internet security’. 
 The conclusion that can be drawn from these new American and British 
legislative efforts is a convergence in aggressive policy aimed at strengthening 
powers of surveillance, whilst sacrificing privacy of their citizens. Both countries 
seem to aim at introducing more intrusive measures, which disregard privacy 
considerations-the CISA by tramping any other laws, whilst the IPB by expressly 
authorising bulk collection and retention of all data with very little meaningful 
independent oversights. Bearing in mind that the 2014 United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution, The Right to Privacy in Digital Age, identified an urgent need 
to bring the already existing legal frameworks in line with the human rights treaties, it 
is hard to see that the CISA and IPB is even a ‘nod in the right direction’.  Rather, it 
seems ‘business as usual’ for the likes of NSA and GCHQ. Will the other three 
members of the Five Eyes follow suit? 
  
  
